Special Assessments for Public Improvements in the City of St. Louis by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 3 Issue 1 
January 1918 
Special Assessments for Public Improvements in the City of St. 
Louis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Special Assessments for Public Improvements in the City of St. Louis, 3 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 052 (1918). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol3/iss1/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS FOR PUBLIC
IMPROVEMENTS IN THE CITY
OF ST. LOUIS.
The Charter of St. Louis amended in 1901 provides in art. 6, sec.
14 that for all improvements of streets, avenues, and public highways,
the expense should be paid, one-fourth part levied upon all property
fronting or adjoining upon such proposed improvement, in the pro-
portional share that each parcel bears to the aggregate; and that three-
fourths of the cost shall be levied against all property embraced within
the benefited area. The Charter further provides that the benefited
area shall be determined by drawing a line midway between the street
to be improved and the next parallel or converging street, on each
side of the said proposed improvement.
Under the above Charter provision an ordinance was passed
whereby a portion of Broadway was to be improved, and along the
proposed improvement the Gast Realty and Investment Company
owned a tract of land having more than one thousand feet frontage
on Broadway and extending west to an average of more than four
hundred feet. The "next street" running "parallel" to Broadway at
that point was some thousand feet west of the proposed improvement.
In assessing that tract, the arbitrary line fixing the benefit district
was drawn midway between Broadway and the next street, thus all
of the tract was embraced within the area to be taxed. While across
the street from this tract the property was taxed to a depth of two
hundred and forty feet because of a street running parallel to "Broad-
way," and in tracts adjoining the Gast property where short streets
paralleled the improvement, the "line" exterlded but one hundred feet
west of "Broadway."
The contract for improvement was let to the Schneider Granite
Company to whom the assessments were payable. The Schneider
Company presented the Gast bill and upon a refusal to pay, brought
suit.
The Missouri Supreme Court1 upheld the assessment as lawful
and proper. But upon writ of error to the United States Supreme
Court the tax was declared unconstitutional.2 That court held that
the rule which so arbitrarily fixed the assessment district was
"bad upon its face as distributing a local tax in grossly unequal
proportions, not because of special considerations applicable to
the parcels taxed, but in blind obedience to a rule that requires
the result. . . The differences were not based upon any con-
sideration of differences in the benefits conferred, but were estab-
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lished mechanically in obedience to the criteria that the Charter
directed to be applied."
In view of that holding by Mr. Justice Holmes, the Missouri .Su-
preme Court rendered its further opinion in accordance with it.
Which was to the effect that the assessment was severable, one:fourth
having the "frontage" basis, and the' three-fourths being levied upon
the "area" within the benefit district, and that the United States Su-
prece Court in its opinion had in no way affected the validity of the
front-foot assessment, and that the assessment for that amount should
therefore be entered up as a judgment against the Realty Co. But
the Realty Company objected to the Missouri Court's ruling and filed
a writ of error to the Supreme Court upon the ground that the Mis-
souri Court committed error in rendering judgment against it. The
Granite Company filed a cross-writ on the ground that the state court
refused an area assessment. But the Supreme Court held that it was
a matter of state law and for the state court to decide how an assess-"
ment should be made, so long as the manner prescribed by it in no
wise violated the Constitution of the United States, and was made with
respect to the rights of the parties thereunder.4 It went on to hold
that an assessment may be valid though the improvement is corn-
court or by an assessing board, so long as it is made within the pro-
hibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
Under the. St. Louis Charter adopted in 1914, Section 10, of Ar-
ticle XXII, provides for improvements of streets, highways, etc., to
be paid, one-third by abutting owners ratable by lineal feet, and the
remainder to be levied against all ground within the benefit or taxing
district. The taxing district is to be determined by a board of com-
missioners appointed for such purpose. They are to "view the prop-
erty to be assessed" 6 and fix the district, giving notice of the time and
place where such assessments will be made.
I have been unable to find any adjudication upon this section, bpt
in view of the preceding cases and the rules there stated, I feel that
this is a vast improvement over the previous arbitrary method of deter-
mining the benefit district. It conforms to the holdings of the United
States Supreme Court and seems eminently fair in providing a notice
and hearing under the "Due Process" clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. F. H. B.
259 Mo., 153.
2240 U. S. 55,60 U. S. L. Ed. 523.
3 269 Mo. 561.
4 US. Adv, Ops. 1917, page 120.
" Art, XX1. Sec. 5.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol3/iss1/5
